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Downes-Martin: Adjudication

Adjudic ation
The Diabolus in Machina of War Gaming
Stephen Downes-Martin

C

ommonly used war-game adjudication methods break down and create
unreliable results when addressing novel operational or strategic problems
for which we have little experience or data (for example, information warfare or
a regional nuclear conflict) and when we wish to explore situations rather than
educate officers about well-understood situations. The primary causes of this
breakdown are, first, the incorrect assumption that adjudicators are impartial
controllers instead of dominant players and, second, the design choice to make
the players’ decisions the game’s primary output. Among the many reasons for
war gaming (such as research and analysis, training, education, and discovery),
this article focuses on “discovery” war games, where the objective is to find out
something previously unknown about a novel operational or strategic problem,
something that cannot be better discovered by other methods, such as seminars,
work groups, modeling and simulation, or operations research.
There exists a wide variety of definitions of
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war gaming, leading to different kinds of games,
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deceive decision makers, how decision makers mis- tions, stand-alone computer models or simulause such methods to deceive themselves, and how to
tions, and closed-form mathematical equations.1
detect such attempts and protect from them. He has
These categories are either too broad to be useful
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or focus on simulations or mathematical models
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enough about the situations being gamed to model
them. They preclude the discovery of insights
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into novel situations by the open-ended exploration of competing interests. In
contrast, the definition of a war game given by Peter Perla—“a warfare model
or simulation that does not involve the operations of actual forces, in which the
flow of events affects and is affected by decisions made during the course of those
events by players representing the opposing sides”—can be used to game novel
operational and strategic situations, focusing on human players and relegating
technology to labor-saving devices.2 While traditional game design focuses on
player decisions, there is reason to think there are problems with treating player
decisions as constituting the game’s primary output and therefore the primary
input data for analysis. I will argue that because of research indicating that human
decisions during a game are not reliably indicative of the decisions they would
make in other circumstances (no matter how similar), other approaches are necessary to extract value from research games.
Newtonian physics and the statistics of small-unit actions provide adjudication rules for determining the possible outcomes of interacting player decisions
when war-gaming tactical-level attrition warfare. The adjudicators either “roll
dice” (i.e., use a statistical model of some form) during deductive games to pick
randomly one of those possible outcomes as the one that actually occurred, or
during inductive games (described below) decide themselves which one occurred
so as to force the players into situations that best address the sponsor’s objectives
for the game. However, for novel operational and strategic problems, we do not
have the equivalent adjudication rules. In these cases the adjudicators (who usually are no better informed about the problem domain than the players) have
first to decide the possible outcomes of interacting player decisions, then decide
which one occurred, and then decide what information to give to the players.3
Research shows that “people are not aware of the reasons that move them; even
an introspective person with incentives to estimate how he or she would have
behaved with different information cannot do this.” 4 This implies that decisions
made during a war game by players and adjudicators are unreliable predictors of
decisions that would be made in the external (and future) real-world situation
the game is attempting to explore. However, research also indicates that human
beliefs are robust even in the face of contradictory evidence.5 On the basis of
this research, I will argue that beliefs that surface during a game, indicated by
the decisions made by the players, should be examined as possibly more reliable
predictors of what would be believed in the external world than the commonly
held belief that decisions in a game can be used as predictors of what decisions
would be made in the external world.
Since adjudicators make decisions not only on the possible outcomes of interacting player decisions but also on which one occurred and on what information to give to the players, they are thus in fact not only players but dominant
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss3/6
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players—diaboli in machina—whose beliefs and consequent actions drive the
game but whose decisions (like those of the other players) are unreliable predictors of what decisions would be made in the external real world the game
is attempting to explore.6 Unless these factors are explicitly handled in design,
execution, data collection, and analysis, the game will produce results that may
be seductively compelling but are ultimately unreliable.
This article proposes an approach to discovery war-gaming of novel operational and strategic problems and offers a partial example from an actual strategic
deterrence and escalation war game, played in 2009. The approach is twofold:
first, treat the adjudicators as players whose behavior provides critical information for analysis; second, focus design and analysis not on the decisions of the
game players but on the beliefs of the players and adjudicators and on how those
beliefs drive decision-making behaviors. Decision making by players in the larger
sense, including adjudicators, is what engages and motivates the participants;
the value of their decisions is in the insights they provide as to the participants’
beliefs, how those beliefs drive behavior, and how the players, adjudicators, and
analysts interpret and attribute importance to the situations that arise from the
players’ competing decisions.
Since war gaming is founded on information flows between players and adjudicators, there is significant and useful overlap in the psychology of decision
making used for novel situations when adjudicating the outcomes of inductivewar-game interactions and that used when assessing live information operations.
Adjudication and operations assessment both require the operator to make decisions in order to create a desired future (or avoid an undesirable one) and to
anticipate future outcomes and decisions by others. The arguments in this article
therefore draw heavily on those made in “Assessing COIN Information Operations Aimed at the Local Population” and on references contained therein.7
Adjudicators Are Dominant Players
Traditional attrition warfare is relatively simple to game and adjudicate. The
outcomes of interactions of the decisions of game players are driven by physics
(for example, external ballistics, logistic flows, time and space factors, etc.) and
the statistics of millennia of small-unit actions. We know these physics- and
statistics-based rules, and adjudicators use them to identify the range of what
could happen as a result of interacting player decisions. Adjudicators consider
moral effects to be contained within the statistics if the game is a deductive one
(that is, aimed at specific implications of a general situation) and decide the
moral factors themselves if the game is inductive (exploring, for instance, the
operational or strategic ramifications of given specifics). In deductive war games,
adjudicators essentially roll the dice using established statistics to determine
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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from the identified range of possible outcomes of interacting player decisions the
specific outcome that will be considered to have occurred in order to place the
players into a new but valid situation in which to make their next moves. Among
the roles of adjudicators is that of umpires, ensuring the players do not break the
laws of physics or statistics. For inductive games, however, instead of rolling the
dice the adjudicators choose from the range of possible outcomes one that forces
players to deal with problems related to the objectives of the sponsors. In either
case, deductive or inductive, the adjudicators also decide what information about
the outcome to provide each of the player teams.
Many of the novel operational and strategic problems in which we are interested do not have associated bodies of physics, case studies, or statistics on which
to base adjudication. For example, what are the rules (the equivalent of “physics” and “statistics”) governing outcomes of information warfare waged during
a regional nuclear conflict? How many such campaigns have been fought? A
reasonable answer for most of the problems in which we are interested is zero
or near zero, and this means that traditional adjudication techniques, based on
traditional game designs, are inadequate for them. But it is precisely such novel,
dangerous operational and strategic problems that it is most important to game,
given the potential costs of not understanding them as well as possible. Modern
novel operational- and strategic-level problems are driven by complex interacting political, military, economic, social, ideological, and infrastructure (PMESII)
effects, most of which we do not understand, or at best grasp only intuitively, and
for which we certainly have no statistically valid sample set of previous situations
on which to draw.
A common approach is to make available to the adjudicators advisers who
are subject-matter experts in the appropriate PMESII areas. These experts draw
on the established base of political-science theory and modeling to provide the
best judgments possible about issues relevant to the problem being war-gamed.
Even given the existence of quantitative political-science models, deductive game
design makes little sense for novel operational and strategic conflict situations;
there are insufficient past examples and therefore statistics to inform adjudication. These situations call exclusively for inductive gaming, in which adjudicators draw on subject-matter experts to identify the range of possible outcomes.
They then decide which of these outcomes did occur, so as to place the players
into situations relevant to the game’s objectives, and finally what information to
provide to the players.8
Note, however, that to force the players to solve problems of interest to the
sponsors, the adjudicators have to forecast what those players might do with the
information they receive. That is, the adjudicators (with their advisers) attempt

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss3/6
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to forecast likely futures using current information. But the reason we are wargaming in the first place is that we do not understand the problem or the rules that
drive the situation. In a traditional war game it is the players’ job to illuminate the
problem with insight and understanding, not that of the adjudicators.
Adjudicators and their advisers, then, make subjective professional decisions
as to the range of what could happen as a result of player decisions, make subjective professional forecasts about what players might do in the future, and make
subjective professional decisions about what information to provide the players.
They do all this from a knowledge base that is as flawed and sparse as that of the
players in the game cells. At best, the adjudicators may have better subject-matter
advisers than do the players—which if true raises the question of why the experts
are not playing the game but instead are advising the adjudicators.9
It is clear that for practical purposes not only are the adjudicators (and their
subject-matter-expert advisers) actually decision-making players but they in fact
dominate the war game, given their control over who gets to know what and
when. In addition, logic offers significant grounds for suspicion as to whether
their expertise is or even can be adequate to adjudicate games addressing novel
situations. Adjudicators and their advisers make their decisions on the basis of
how they believe “the world works”—beliefs that become by definition the rules
for adjudication. So the adjudicators get to decide the rules of the war game
dynamically, starting from a position of ignorance, as game play proceeds. All
this seems to justify a rethinking of how we game novel operational and strategic
problems.
Player Decisions Are Unreliable
A discovery war game must produce results or insights that are relevant to the
external, possibly future, world. The game cannot be primarily educational or
training, since for a novel situation we do not have enough information to teach
or solutions to train. Therefore we look to the discovery game to provide reliable
proxies of the external real-world situation. Unfortunately, research indicates that
game decisions do not provide reliable predictors of the decisions the players or
others would make if the situation were real.
People Cannot Predict Their Own Decisions—Let Alone Other People’s. Psychology and decision-science research into the “adaptive unconscious” theory of mind
indicates that even reflective people are poor at predicting the decisions they
would make under different information circumstances.10 Decisions are driven
for most people in great part by the (adaptive) unconscious, which—because
it is not directly observable by the decision maker—means that decision makers’ ability to predict or explain how they would make decisions under different
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circumstances is doubtful at best. Although people tend to recognize cognitive
biases in others and to take these into account, they also tend to be convinced that
their own perceptions directly reflect reality and to fail to take into account their
own biases.11 Experimentation shows that this often results in people providing
incorrect explanations for their decisions while simultaneously being convinced
those reasons are correct.12 Given that the circumstances and information context of some future real world that the game is attempting to explore will inevitably be different from those of the game, it is thus at best unreasonable to assume
that decisions made in a war game would be reflective of decisions made by the
same people in some real-world scenario or to take seriously the reasons given
by the players for their decisions, since we know that people tend to confabulate
when providing reasons for their decisions. But this is precisely what we ask players to do—to imagine, knowing they are in a “war game,” with the real present
all around them, that instead they are in some future (or other) environment and
to make decisions as though the artificial game world in which they are playing
is real and to provide reasons justifying their decisions.13 Analysts and sponsors
then try to draw from the decisions made in the game conclusions about decisions that would be valid in such a future (or other) environment.
Further, if decisions made in a game are unreliable predictors of decisions made
in some future world, the situation becomes worse when attempting to use game
decisions as predictors of other people’s decisions—that is, those made in a realworld situation by the actual friendly or enemy decision makers whose roles the
players occupied in the game. War-game “red cells” (playing the opposition) have
serious problems when they are supposed to represent other cultures. Mirrorimaging does not matter when we are interested in “Blue” (friendly) decisions
in the face of Red capabilities; in such a case Red simply takes the actions most
dangerous to Blue within the context of game objectives, without regard to real
cultural proclivities. But mirror-imaging does matter when we are interested in
Blue decisions in the face of Red intentions or in Red decision-making behaviors.
Obtaining experts in Red thinking brings several problems. Expatriates from
countries of interest often have political agendas, are not necessarily expert in
their own countries’ political and military decision-making styles (how many
disgruntled Americans are truly expert on the political and military cultures of
the United States?), and face security-clearance issues. U.S. citizens who both
are genuinely expert in foreign cultures and can obtain clearances are rare; we
can only assume—not know—that their interpretations of foreign cultures are
accurate.
Unskilled People Are Unaware of It, and Skilled People Are Overconfident. Adjudicators and their expert advisers are by definition, as we have seen, unskilled
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at war-gaming novel operational and strategic problems, precisely because they
are novel, with no statistics and case studies are few and analogical. Two effects
demonstrated by psychology research combine to make this a serious problem
for adjudication. First, people in the lowest quartile of actual competence tend to
self-assess themselves as in the second-to-highest quartile; their incompetence
is so great it robs them of the ability to realize they are incompetent. People in
the highest quartile of actual competence tend to self-assess themselves within
the highest quartile but slightly lower than is actually the case; they inflate their
colleagues’ competence compared to their own.14 Second, research shows that
older and more experienced people tend to be vastly overconfident about their
ability to control events that involve chance.15 Their successes in past situations,
many of which involved elements of chance, lead them to underestimate the role
of luck and to overestimate their ability to handle contingent situations.16 This is
especially true in competitive situations, where competence at bluffing can mask
actual incompetence.17 So war games addressing novel concepts get flooded with
players, adjudicators, and subject-matter advisers who are not expert but confidently believe they are.
Overconfident People Believe They Already Know the Answer. In nearly all cases
of scientific fraud, three risk factors have been identified as present: the perpetrators “knew, or thought they knew, what the answer to the problem they were
considering would turn out to be if they went to all the trouble of doing the work
properly; were under career pressure; and were working in a field where individual experiments are not expected to be precisely reproducible.”18 In war games,
the first factor is likely present for senior, more experienced people—precisely the
sort of people invited to be adjudicators or expert advisers—given the results of
the psychology research just presented, that older and more experienced people
tend to be unaware of their lack of skills in novel situations and to be overconfident. The second factor is often, though not always, present among players;
the third factor is clearly characteristic of war gaming. The three risk factors for
(perhaps unintended) intellectual fraud must be considered likely to be present
when war-gaming novel and important operational and strategic problems using
senior officers and civilians as players, adjudicators, and experts.
Beliefs Are Robust in the Face of Contradictory Evidence. Amplifying the overconfidence problem is the effect demonstrated by research that “beliefs can survive potent logical or empirical challenges. They can survive and even be bolstered
by evidence that most uncommitted observers would agree logically demands
some weakening of such beliefs. They can even survive the total destruction of
their original evidential bases.”19 Asking someone to generate an explanation of
why something is true often will strengthen belief in that “something” even after
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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contradictory evidence is provided.20 In addition, corrections to erroneous evidence may actually strengthen misperceptions under some circumstances.21 This
is especially troubling when the war-game designer and analyst consider asking
players for their explanations of why they and their opponents made decisions.
The Central Intelligence Agency analyst community suggests four reasons for
the persistence of (even discredited) beliefs; “We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive; mind sets tend to be quick to form but resistant to change; new
information is assimilated to existing images; and initial exposure to blurred or
ambiguous stimuli interferes with accurate perception even after more and better
information becomes available.”22 Therefore I propose that beliefs identified during a war game should be used as predictors for how players (including adjudicators) would interpret information in the real world, and I suggest that it is these
(and not the decisions themselves) that give us insight into what behaviors might
occur in the real world.
Player Decisions Generate Situations of Interest in Discovery Games. An argument for the importance of situations generated by interacting decisions can be
made. What if a series of player decisions creates a novel situation that can be
examined to identify incentives for action?23 Although players’ decisions are unreliable predictors of future decisions in the real world and are thus not intrinsically of interest, since they cannot be used to predict real decisions, the situations that interacting player decisions generate can be of interest in a discovery
game at the operational and strategic levels.24 Consider the Japanese pre-Midway
war games.25 During these games the contingency of a U.S. carrier task force appearing on the flank of Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s force was discounted.26 The
war-game decision to posit a flanking force could not be used by the Imperial
Japanese Navy (IJN) staff to predict that the United States would indeed carry
out such an action. It was the contingency itself that was important, but it was the
beliefs and cognitive biases of IJN leadership that dictated that this contingency
was not to be considered interesting.27 The fact that the U.S. carrier task force did
indeed turn up on the flank was independent of the IJN war-game decision. The
beliefs and biases that led to the contingency’s being ignored should have been
identified and challenged by the war-game designers and analysts, but they were
not, due to the seniority of the officers holding those beliefs and suffering those
biases. As research indicates, beliefs are robust even in the face of contradictory
evidence, and the failure or inability to take this factor into account when dealing
with senior officers during war games can have unfortunate consequences.
What Is to Be Done?
There exists a requirement to war-game novel operational and strategic problems for exploratory and discovery purposes. However, using traditional game
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss3/6
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design for this purpose generates two significant risks. First, adjudicators will
be overconfident and underqualified and their behaviors, though critical to
the game’s outcome, will be neither collected nor analyzed, and second, there
will be an overreliance on game decisions made by players and adjudicators
in drawing conclusions about the real world under investigation, despite the
evidence that such decisions are not good predictors of decisions made in
the real world. Such a game is likely to produce unreliable, even deceptive
conclusions.
These diaboli in machina must be exorcised. I propose that novel operational
and strategic problems be gamed following two principles. First, explicitly treat
the control cell and its adjudicators as players, whose behavior and demographics are to be collected and analyzed in the same way as those of other players.
Second, shape the war game as a “signaling game,” in comparing messages sent
by players (including adjudication and Control), either explicitly as communications or implicitly in their actions, with how those messages were interpreted
by the receiving players.28 Since beliefs drive interpretation of information, the
design should include collection of what players believe about themselves and
about other players. From a player perspective, decisions serve to engage and
motivate the players, but from the war-game sponsor and designer perspective
they exist to force the players to confront and interpret (or misinterpret) information through the lens of their beliefs and to send messages back by their
decisions or explicit communications. The substantive thread of interacting
decisions made by player cells and Control generates one possible story from a
huge range of possible outcomes; they are not, in and of themselves, important.
However, the contingencies that arise, including decisions not taken, can be
important—especially those contingencies of decisions dismissed by adjudicators in their role of dominant players. The players’ explanations for dismissing
a decision or a contingency cannot be taken seriously in a discovery game; it
is the underlying beliefs and biases driving the decisions that are important, as
well as the contingency itself.
Analysis of messaging—interpretation, misinterpretation, and intentions—
will provide reasonable indications of beliefs and therefore predictors of how
information might be interpreted or misinterpreted in the real world, which in
turn drives decision making. War-game design should focus not on what decisions were made but on why they were made and not made, what messages the
players intended to send by their decisions and what messages were received,
what behaviors they wanted to elicit from the other players by their decisions and
what behaviors they instead obtained.
The design must require that as information flows into a game cell via the
control cell (as the result of adjudication decisions) players answer the following
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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questions (in addition to taking other, traditional player actions) about each of
the other teams playing (including the control cell and adjudicators):29

• What are the other cells attempting to achieve, make us do, or make us
believe?

• What message are the other cells sending us?
• What do the other cells believe about us?
• What do we believe about the other cells?
• What do we believe about ourselves?
When the control cell answers these questions it is in effect conducting realtime game analysis. Also, as the players (including Control and adjudicators)
generate their respective decisions as a result of changes generated by other players and Control they must be required to answer the questions:

• What effect are we trying to achieve (physical effects on the other players,
reactions taken by the other players, changes to their beliefs)?

• What is the message we intend to send to whom by our actions?
• What are the risks and unintended possible consequences of each action?
It has been known for players to reject a game’s validity because events in the
game did not conform to specific prior beliefs. So in addition to the players’ beliefs about themselves and the other cells obtained during the game, it is critical
to elicit from the players at the end of the game their criticisms concerning the
validity of the game, along with their reasons for these criticisms. Although these
are obviously useful for design improvement, the main reason for collecting this
information (assuming the game was properly designed and executed in the first
place) is to identify players’ beliefs and cognitive biases about what they believe
should have happened vice what did happen in the game, since these beliefs will
in part affect future decision making.
Analysis should examine the disconnects between expectations and results,
between players’ beliefs about themselves and others’ beliefs about themselves,
and player responses to the differences between these disconnects, under the
hypotheses that the beliefs driving expectations and responses are robust and
therefore reasonable predictors of beliefs those players would bring to the real
world and that people are poor at identifying their own real beliefs.
Psychology and decision-science research plainly indicates that traditional
war-game design, specifically adjudication, puts results in serious doubt in
the context of novel operational and strategic problems. The solution is to
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treat adjudicators (or more broadly, the control cell) as dominant players and
to focus design, data collection, and analysis on interpretation and misinterpretation of messages and beliefs instead of on decisions. A partial example of
this design—a focus on messaging and beliefs—was successfully used by a war
game in 2009 (see the sidebar). Although it may be onerous, time consuming,
or difficult to treat adjudicators or the control cell as players and collect information from them it is required if the game is to be valid, and hence it must be
part of design and execution.

Every year the Mahan Scholars (an advanced research project group at the
Naval War College) and U.S. Strategic Command sponsor a strategic deterrence and escalation war game. The game, known as DEGRE, is run by the
War Gaming Department of the College. In 2009 the game design explicitly
followed the second of the two design principles proposed above; that is, it
was conducted as a signaling war game (see figure 1) and explicitly analyzed
beliefs and messaging so as to fulfill the sponsors’ objectives for the game.
The war-game design did not explicitly analyze the adjudicators and their
subject-matter-expert advisers as players. However, the design could be easily
extended to do so; the same “signaling information” could be collected from
the adjudicators and their advisers as from the traditional player cells (as in
figure 2). (See “NWC Conducts Deterrence and Escalation Game and Review
2010,” Naval War College, April 2010, www.usnwc.edu/.)

FIGURE 1
EXAMPLE MESSAGE AND BELIEF GAME DESIGN BETWEEN TWO PLAYERS
Blue Cell

Red Cell
War-Game Actions

Desired reactions by Red
Blue actions

compare

Red actions
Desired reactions by Blue

Blue assessments of risks and unintended
consequences of Blue actions

compare

Red assessments of risks and unintended
consequences of Red actions

Analysis of Possible Drivers of Actions
Messages sent by Blue (communications
and actions)

compare

Messages received by Red (interpretation of
communications and intentions behind
actions)

Messages received by Blue (interpretation
of communications and intentions behind
actions)

compare

Messages sent by Red (communications
and actions)

Blue beliefs about self

compare

Red beliefs about Blue

Blue beliefs about Red

compare

Red beliefs about self
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FIGURE 2
EXAMPLE MESSAGE AND BELIEF GAME DESIGN INCLUDING CONTROL AS A PLAYER
Player Cell (any “color”)

Control Cell (adjudication)
War-Game Actions

Desired reactions by control cell
Player cell actions

compare

Control cell adjudication
Desired reactions by player cell

Player cell assessments of risks and unintended consequences of player cell actions

compare

Control cell assessments of risks and
unintended consequences of Control
adjudications

Analysis of Possible Drivers of Actions
Messages sent by player cell to Control
(communications and actions)

compare

Messages received by control cell (interpretation of communications and intentions
behind actions)

Messages received by player cell (interpretation of communications and intentions
behind actions)

compare

Messages sent by control cell (communications and actions)

Player cell beliefs about self

compare

Control beliefs about player cell

Player cell beliefs about Control

compare

Control beliefs about self
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We know how to
wargame traditional
attrition warfare

We want to wargame
novel operational and
strategic problems

The outcomes of interacting
player decisions are driven
by physics and statistics

Modern operational or strategic problems
are driven by complex interacting PMESII
issues, we do not know these rules for
complex modern problems

We know the physics and statistics rules that
govern battlefield dynamics so adjudication uses
these to decide the range of what could happen

Adjudication uses subject matter
expert judgment to decide the
range of what could happen

For deductive games adjudicators “roll the dice” to
decide what did happen in order to put players
into a statistically valid situation, they are umpires

For inductive games adjudicators decide what
did happen in order to force players into an
situation that satisfies the objective of the game

People playing or adjudicating
novel problems are by definition
unskilled at those problems

Subject Matter Experts and
Adjudicators tend to be older and
more experienced people

Slightly depressed and negative
people tend to be better able to think
skeptically, but are not good leaders
and often not hired as adjudicators

Adjudicators decide what
information to provide players
and give that to them

Players make decisions in response
to information about opponents
given to them by adjudicators

We want insights into novel problems
for which there are insufficient
statistics or historical case studies for
other forms of analysis

Adjudicators control the game, they
are the primary players in discovery
games, not just umpires

Older and more
experienced people tend
to be overconfident [15]

Overconfident people blur the
line between what they can
control and what they cannot [15]

Unskilled people grossly
overestimate their own skill
because they do not know
how little they know [14]

Treat the adjudication and white cell as players
whose behavior and demographics are collected and
analyzed in the same way as those of other players
People cannot predict the
decisions they or others
would make under different
information conditions [10]

Cannot use game decisions as a
predictor of decisions that players,
adjudicators or subject matter
experts would make in real life

The three risk factors are
present for fraudulent
decision making [18]

Wargames are not expected
to be precisely reproducible

LEGEND
What do we want?

What helps us get it?

Why do we want it?

What should we do?
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Why is this a problem?

Examine why decisions were made and not
made, what messages the actions were
intended to send, and what messages were
received for both players and adjudicators

Players, adjudicators and
sponsors are often under
career pressure

Can use beliefs exhibited during a game
as a predictor of how players,
adjudicators and subject matter experts
would interpret information in real life

Players, adjudicators and
sponsors often believe they
already know the answer [18]

Peoples’ beliefs are robust,
even under contradictory
information [19]

Peoples’ statements about their
beliefs are unreliable and so
cannot be directly used [5]
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